Recent research has revealed a striking tendency in young children to imitate even causally irrelevant actions, a phenomenon dubbed 'over-imitation'. To investigate whether children develop beyond this, we allowed both adults and children to witness either a child or adult model performing goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant actions to extract a reward from a transparent puzzle box. Surprisingly, copying of irrelevant actions increased with age, with the adults performing the task with less efficiency than the children. Participants of all ages were more likely to perform the irrelevant actions performed by an adult model, than by a child model. These results suggest that people may become more imitative as they mature, whilst selectively copying particular models with a high level of fidelity. We suggest that this combination of faithful copying and selectivity underwrites the powerful social learning necessary for the level of cultural transmission on which our species depends.
Recent research has revealed a striking tendency in young children to imitate even causally irrelevant actions, a phenomenon dubbed 'over-imitation'. To investigate whether children develop beyond this, we allowed both adults and children to witness either a child or adult model performing goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant actions to extract a reward from a transparent puzzle box. Surprisingly, copying of irrelevant actions increased with age, with the adults performing the task with less efficiency than the children. Participants of all ages were more likely to perform the irrelevant actions performed by an adult model, than by a child model. These results suggest that people may become more imitative as they mature, whilst selectively copying particular models with a high level of fidelity. We suggest that this combination of faithful copying and selectivity underwrites the powerful social learning necessary for the level of cultural transmission on which our species depends.
A curious, recently discovered phenomenon, 'over-imitation', has become of much interest in developmental, comparative, and evolutionary literatures (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Custance, Prato-Previde, Spiezio, Rigamonti, & Poli, 2006; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan & Graham, in press; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008) . Whereas 'imitation' is a term used to describe a recognizable match between an observer's and a model's behaviour (Whiten & Ham, 1992) , 'over-imitation' distinguishes instances where the observer reproduces such a high fidelity match of the model's behaviour that task efficiency is reduced (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007) . Such over-imitation thus appears to display an initially puzzling 'irrational' or 'mindless' character (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009 ).
The phenomenon of over-imitation was evident in a recent study in which 3-yearold children, and chimpanzees, observed an adult human model perform a variety of actions with a stick tool in order to retrieve a reward from inside either a transparent or an opaque puzzle box (Horner & Whiten, 2005) . The actions performed by the model included a mixture of goal-related actions and causally irrelevant actions. Which of the actions were ineffectual was plainly visible through each face of the transparent box, whereas the effects of the tool were hidden in the opaque box condition. The young chimpanzees conformed to the experimental hypothesis by employing the irrelevant actions in the opaque condition more than in the transparent condition. By contrast, and surprisingly, the child subjects were extremely imitative across the two very different conditions, reproducing even the causally irrelevant actions on the transparent box with a high level of fidelity. Lyons et al. (2007) confirmed this effect in young children using a similar task and additional ones, and showed that a variety of efforts to 're-train' children to act otherwise failed, leading the authors to describe these children as being susceptible to an 'automatic coding process' that leads them to over-imitate (Lyons et al., 2007, p. 19751) . Indeed, the only condition in which over-imitation was not evident was one (Expt 2B) in which the irrelevant actions were performed on an object completely disconnected to that containing the goal.
In recent studies with young children, we have used the same task as that used by Horner and Whiten (2005) to extend this work both forwards and backwards in age. We found increasing levels of imitation from 3 to 5 years of age (McGuigan et al., 2007) and between 2 years and these later ages ). Intriguingly, Nielsen and Tomaselli (in press) have found evidence of over-imitation on this task as late as 13 years, even persisting in groups of children outside our own culture (Kalahari Bushmen children). In other studies, using more basic actions, evidence of over-imitation has been documented as early as 18 months (Nielsen, 2006) . However, at present, we do not know how far this trend will extend. Will adults leave behind this apparently 'mindless' copying?
Currently, we know very little about imitation in adult humans, whether of tool-use or other actions. Two initial studies have generated somewhat mixed results. Horowitz (2003) found adults to be less imitative than did Custance et al. (2006) in extracting a reward from inside an 'artificial fruit'. Custance et al. (2006) described their adult sample as 'super-imitators' because they imitated down to the level of detail of the particular finger used by a model. However, all of the modelled actions in the task used by Custance et al. (2006) and Horowitz (2003) were causally relevant to reward retrieval. It has yet to be discovered whether adults may over-imitate aspects of tool actions despite visual evidence they are causally irrelevant.
As well as exploring whether both adults and children will over-imitate, we were interested in whether the degree of over-imitation would vary according to model identity. We currently know very little about potential influences that the identity of the model may have on both adult and child imitation, in particular whether presentation by a child versus an adult model will affect fidelity on the task. In their study of adult social learning, Custance et al. (2006) varied the identity of the model (adult human or pig-tailed macaque), but did not analyse performance separately for each model. With respect to children, few studies have directly compared the influence of child and adult models on social learning. Early theoretical approaches to children's learning conflicted, with Piaget (1962) highlighting the importance of peers, and Vygotsky (1978) emphasizing the importance of adults. Recent empirical studies provide somewhat mixed results on this issue, with some studies finding no difference between child and adult models (Abravnel & DeYoung, 1997) , and others finding an imitative increase in favour of child models (Owens & Ascione, 1991; Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000) . Such variation may reflect the content of the task. We suggest that the enormous significance of technology for our species predicts that children will pay particular attention to 'expert' adults modelling tool actions.
In the current study, we had two broad aims: (1) to present the identical transparent box task to that used by Horner and Whiten (2005) to 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and for the first time, adult participants, and (2) to vary the identity of the model, with participants of each age witnessing task demonstration by either a child or an adult model. In this way, we investigated a 3 × 2 matrix of potential outcomes. We predicted that over-imitation would occur in our adult model condition, as previous studies have found children and adults to imitate tool actions performed by an adult model with a high level of fidelity (Custance et al., 2006; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007) . When our participants were exposed to our new child model condition, it was less clear what outcome should be predicted. Blanket imitation might be expected, as some previous studies have found children to be highly imitative of peers (Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Hannah & Meltzoff, 1993; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006) , and adults highly imitative of even non-human models (Custance et al., 2006) . Alternatively, participants could be selective in whom they choose to imitate. Participants of each age could potentially see a younger demonstrator as a less reliable model, and adopt a less imitative approach than they would following task demonstration by an adult, or even a child older than them.
Methods

Participants
Forty-eight children were recruited from primary schools and nurseries in Central Scotland and divided into two age groups: a 3-year-old group (13 males and 11 females, mean age = 44 months; range = 39-47 months; SD = 3 months), and a 5-year-old group (10 males and 14 females; mean age = 64 months; range = 60-69 months; SD = 2 months). Twenty-four adults were also recruited from staff and students at Heriot-Watt University. None of the participants were told the purpose of the experiment; all adults consented simply to take part in a short psychology study. The adult group consisted of 11 male and 13 female participants (mean age = 42 years; range = 20-63 years, SD = 13 years). Three 3-year-old children were excluded from the study due to a failure to engage with the task.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a polycarbonate box, identical to one of the two used by McGuigan et al. (2007) . The box was transparent, with two square holes (2 × 2 cm), one situated on the top of the box and covered by two sliding bolts, the other on the front, covered by a door defence (see Figure 1) . The bolts could be removed by pushing or dragging them to one side, and the door removed by lifting, or sliding to one side. The front hole was connected to a sloping, opaque tube which ended inside the box and contained a reward (a Velcro-backed sticker). To retrieve the reward, a Velcro tipped aluminium tool (22 cm long) was inserted into the tube after removal of the door defence. Any actions made to the top of the box were causally irrelevant to the retrieval of the reward, as insertion of the tool into the top hole simply resulted in the tool striking a barrier. In this way, all tool actions made with the box could be deemed either causally relevant (directed to the front hole) or causally irrelevant (directed towards the top hole).
Two-action approach
In order to provide a detailed account of the level of fidelity with which the defences were removed, a 'two-action' design was employed, common in comparative psychology and more recently, developmental psychology (Whiten, Flynn, Brown, & Lee, 2006) . When retrieving the reward, the model demonstrated the action sequence in one of two combinations. Method 1 (push bolts-lift door) showed the bolts being removed by pushing them with the tool from the right-hand side of the box (push bolts), and the door being opened by manually lifting (lift door). In method 2 (drag bolts-slide door), the bolts were dragged to the left using the tool (drag bolts) and the door was manually slid to one side (slide door). Stimulus enhancement was controlled for in the design, by directing attention to the object by initially tapping each bolt three times on the opposite side from where it would then be dragged or pushed.
Design
Participants in each age group (3 years, 5 years, adult) were allocated to one of two conditions: child model or adult model. The child and adult models were both female, and were aged 5 years and 30 years, respectively. To ensure consistency of presentation, particularly with respect to the child model, all task demonstrations were videotaped and subsequently presented to the participants on a laptop display. In each video, the model was shown sitting at a desk to the left of the box. She was constantly visible from the waist upwards and turned so that participants could easily see whether the model was a child or an adult (see Figure 2) . The model retrieved a reward from the box using either method 1 (push bolts and lift door) or method 2 (drag bolts and slide door), with half of the participants in each condition witnessing method 1 and half witnessing method 2. Therefore, in total, there were four conditions, presented in a between-participants design: adult model condition (method 1 vs. 2), child model condition (method 1 vs. 2). All child participants were matched within each condition on the basis of age group (3 or 5 years) and verbal mental age, as assessed by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982) . Adults were matched on the basis of chronological age.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room, either within the child's school or within the university campus building as applicable. Upon entering the room, the participant was seated in front of a laptop computer and instructed 'You sit here. Watch what happens on the computer because you will have a go (pointing to the covered test box) in a minute'. Given that we wished to avoid asking participants to imitate, such an instruction was designed to offer the minimal information necessary to complete the experiment. Once the participant was comfortable, the experimenter, who was a different adult female to that in the video demonstration, started the video display showing either the child or adult model. The first stage of the demonstration provided by the model was causally irrelevant to reward retrieval -tapping bolt ends three times, removing both bolts, then inserting the tool into the top hole and striking it sharply downwards three times. The actions demonstrated in the second stage were causally relevant to obtaining the reward -opening the door and inserting the tool in the front hole in order to extract the reward. Once the task demonstration was complete, the participant was told 'Now it's your turn' and was allowed to interact with the box. As the participants' spontaneous actions were of interest, any instructions to imitate were thus explicitly avoided. Following the procedure utilized by McGuigan et al. (2007) , each participant was presented with three consecutive demonstrations followed by their first trial, before a further two demonstrations and two trials. The sequence was thus:
On the extremely rare occasions that a participant appeared distracted during the demonstration, they were told 'Watch carefully because you are going to have a go in a minute'. This applied to a small number of child participants only and was not necessary for adults. Each trial lasted 5 min, until the participant successfully retrieved the reward from the box, or until the participant was reluctant to continue, whichever occurred first. If any participant asked for help or did not interact with the box the experimenter said 'What do you think you do? Can you show me?' No other cues were given and any requests for direction answered with 'Do whatever you think'. After retrieval the box was re-baited and re-covered out of sight of the participant. No feedback or confirmation was provided by the experimenter. After the experiment was over, the adult participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire asking 'What do you think the goal of the experiment was?' and 'Why did you perform the task as you did?' All trials were videotaped for future analysis.
Coding
The videotaped behaviour of each participant was analysed as in McGuigan et al. (2007) by recording each occurrence of the following actions:
Causally irrelevant actions
Tap bolt (TB) Remove bolt defence using push technique (PB) Remove bolt defence using drag technique (DB) Insert tool in top, 'irrelevant' hole (ITIr)
Causally relevant actions
Remove door defence using lift technique (LD) Remove door defence using slide technique (SD) Insert tool in front, 'relevant' hole (ITRe)
Reward retrieval (RR)
Scoring Irrelevant tool insertions. Of particular interest was the proportion of causally irrelevant tool insertions performed by each age group across each model condition. The proportion of irrelevant tool insertions produced by each participant was calculated by dividing the total number of times the tool was inserted into the top, irrelevant hole (ITIr) by the total number of tool insertions (ITIr + ITRe), made across all three trials. This provided an index of over-imitation which we termed an 'irrelevant tool insertion score' which could range from 0, indicating only relevant tool insertions, to 1, where the tool was only inserted into the top, irrelevant hole. Exact reproduction of the model would generate a score of 0.75 (3 irrelevant tool insertions, divided by 4 tool insertions in total), with extreme imitators receiving a higher score, reflecting their greater over-imitative tendency.
Fidelity to the two-action method. Of further interest was the extent to which participants copied the exact technique used by the model to open both the bolt and door defences. The score for each defence was calculated in a similar way to that for irrelevant tool insertions, with the tendency to reproduce the observed technique being calculated as a proportion of total actions performed across all three trials. For example, to calculate the proportion of bolt pushes, the total number of times the participant pushed the bolt (PB) was divided by the total number of bolt removals performed (PB + DB). The scores for each respective method could range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing no reproduction of the demonstrated method, and 1 representing complete fidelity to the method witnessed. Fidelity to the door technique was calculated in an identical way; thus, the maximum fidelity score for reproduction of both bolt and door defence removals was 1.
Results
Inter-rater reliability
The data from 19 participants, representing 26% of the total sample, were re-coded by an independent observer who was naive to the purpose and hypothesis of the experiment. Inter-rater reliability was high for the number of irrelevant tool insertions (Cohen's = .86), the methods of bolt defence removal (Cohen's = 1.0), and door defence removal (Cohen's = .87).
Task completion
Of the 72 trials undertaken by the 3-year-olds, only three trials resulted in no reward retrieval, all in the adult model condition. This extremely high success rate was also witnessed at 5 years, where reward retrieval occurred on all but one trial in the adult model condition. The adult group retrieved the reward successfully on every trial across conditions.
Main analyses Reproduction of irrelevant tool insertions
Preliminary analyses revealed that the occurrence of irrelevant tool insertions did not vary across trials 1-3 in any of the age groups, in either model condition. The data are therefore collapsed across trials in the following analysis.
A 3 × 2 univariate ANOVA with model type (adult or child) and age group (3 years, 5 years, or adult) as between-participants factors was conducted on the proportion of irrelevant tool insertions performed across the three trials. The analysis revealed a highly significant effect of model type (F(1,66) = 17.8, p < .001, partial 2 = .21; see Figure 3) , with a significantly greater number of irrelevant tool insertions occurring in the adult model condition (mean = 0.46), as compared to the child model condition (mean = 0.22). The analysis also revealed a highly significant effect of age group (F(2,66) = 17.0, p < .001, partial 2 = .34; see Figure 3 ), with post hoc Tukey honestly significant difference tests indicating that the adults performed significantly more irrelevant tool insertions (mean = 0.56), than both the 5-year-olds (mean = 0.32; p = .003), and the 3-year-olds (mean = 0.15; p < .001). The difference between the two groups of child participants was marginally significant (p = .054).
Other analyses
Reproduction of two-action method of bolt and door defence removal
Of additional interest was whether the participants would adopt the same technique as the model for removing the bolt and door defences, and whether the level of fidelity would vary across models. A univariate ANOVA with model type (child or adult), age group (3 years, 5 years, or adult), and method witnessed (push lift or drag slide) as between-participants factors was conducted on (1) the proportion of the observed bolt method performed and (2) the proportion of the observed door method performed, across the three trials for each of the model conditions (maximum fidelity for each technique = 1).
Door defence removals
The analysis of door defence removals revealed no significant main effects of model type (mean child model = 0.78; mean adult model = 0.87; F(1, 60) = 2.65, p = .11, partial 2 = .042; see Figure 4 ), or age group (mean 3s = 0.92; mean 5s = 0.81; mean adults = 0.75; F(2, 60) = 2.2, p = .12, partial 2 = .07). However, the analysis did reveal a highly significant effect of method witnessed (F(1,60) = 11.3, p = .001, partial 2 = .16; see Figure 4 ), with participants being significantly more faithful to the lift door technique (mean lift = 0.93), than the slide door technique (mean slide = 0.71). The analysis also revealed a significant interaction between method witnessed and model type (F(1, 60) = 11.3, p = .001, partial 2 = .16), as well as between method witnessed, model type, and age group (F(2, 60) = 3.69, p = .031, partial 2 = .11). Participants of all ages performed the door technique demonstrated by the adult model with a high level of fidelity (mean lift = 0.86; mean slide = 0.88). By contrast, fidelity was more variable following task demonstration by the child model, with the participants being more faithful to the lift door technique (mean lift = 1.0) than the slide door technique (mean slide = 0.53). The level of fidelity was also found to vary with the age of the observer, with the 3-year-olds being more likely to copy both of the techniques used by the child model (mean lift = 1.0; mean slide = 0.88), than the 5-year-olds (mean lift = 1.0; mean slide = 0.40) or the adults (mean lift = 1.0; mean slide = 0.28).
Bolt defence removals
The analysis of bolt defence removals revealed no significant main effects of model type (mean child model = 0.91; mean adult model = 0.82; F(1, 48) = 2.6, p = .11, partial 2 = .05; see Figure 5 ), or age group (mean 3s = 0.70; mean 5s = 0.93; mean adults = 0.90; F(2, 48) = 1.3, p = .29, partial 2 = .05). The analysis did however reveal a significant interaction between age group and model type (F(2, 48) = 5.9, p = .005, partial 2 = .20), with the 3-year-olds performing bolt actions with substantially less fidelity following task demonstration by the adult model than the child model (mean child model = 0.99; mean adult model = 0.41). In contrast, both the 5-year-olds (mean child model = 0.94; mean adult model = 0.92) and the adults (mean child model = 0.83; mean adult model = 0.96) performed with a high level of fidelity across model conditions.
The analysis also revealed a significant effect of method observed (F(1, 48) = 5.5, p = .024, partial 2 = .10) with the participants being more faithful to the push technique (mean push = 0.94) than the drag technique (mean drag = 0.78). Method observed was also found to interact significantly with age group (F(2, 48) = 6.4, p = .003, partial 2 = .21), with the 3-year-olds (mean push = 0.99; mean drag = 0.41) and the 5-yearolds (mean push = 1.0; mean drag = 0.83) performing with greater fidelity following a push bolts demonstration, whereas the adults were more faithful to the drag bolt technique (mean push = 0.83; mean drag = 0.96). A further interaction was revealed between method observed and model type (F(1, 48) = 13.5, p = .001, partial 2 = .22). Participants in the child model condition performed the modelled technique with a high level of fidelity (mean drag = 0.88; mean push = 0.95), whereas participants in the adult model condition displayed a strong tendency to push the bolts irrespective of the technique observed (mean drag = 0.65; mean push = 1.0).
Adult interviews
Participants' responses to questioning about the presumed goal of the experiment, fell into six different categories (see Table 1 ). Only 7 of the 24 adult participants suggested that the goal of the experiment was to have participants imitate the action sequence as modelled. Just two participants (4%) correctly suggested that the purpose of the experiment was to determine whether people would imitate irrelevant actions (e.g., 'To see if people do illogical things like tapping 3 times with no reason just because someone else does it'.). A majority of responses (67%) offered alternative ideas. The other predominant response made by six of the participants, was simply that the goal Table 1 . Participant responses to 'What did you think the goal of the experiment was?'
From over-imitation to super-copying 11 Table 2 . Pattern of performance witnessed at each age with respect to the two-action method of defence removal: Ticks represent high fidelity, crosses represent low fidelity, based on results illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 was to retrieve the reward (e.g., 'The goal appeared to be to get the square out of the box'.).
Discussion
In this study, we replicated earlier research revealing 'over-imitation' in young children (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007) . After watching an adult model, 5-year-old children performed almost as many irrelevant as relevant actions (Figure 3) . For 3-yearolds the proportion of irrelevant acts was closer to one-quarter, thus confirming our earlier finding of a rise in over-imitation with age. 1 We found that rather than growing out of such a tendency, adults continued to copy in an unselective fashion, adopting irrelevant actions with an even higher level of fidelity than the children, consistent with the level of fidelity that Custance et al. (2006) called 'super-copying'. Age-related increases in fidelity with respect to irrelevant tool insertions were also witnessed in the child model condition, although the overall number of tool insertions was markedly lower.
The age-related changes in fidelity of copying irrelevant actions were largely mirrored in the fidelity with which details of manipulation of the box were executed (see Table 2 ). Of the three age groups, adults and 5-year-olds were most similar, not the two groups of children. Both adults and 5-year-olds showed a significant tendency to copy both bolt and door techniques performed by the adult model, and both bolt techniques performed by the child model, neglecting only to match door sliding by the child model. By contrast, the 3-year-olds did not copy the bolt dragging technique of the adult model, instead unselectively pushing the bolts. They did, however match whichever of the door techniques was performed by the child model and were thus more prone, overall, to copy the child model than were the older children and adults, perhaps because for the 3-year-olds alone, the child model was older than they were.
We thus identified two strong, age-related effects: first, an increasing tendency to engage in high fidelity and even apparently 'mindless?' copying of manifestly causally irrelevant actions from 3 years old, to 5 years old to adulthood and second, a preference to copy older models more than younger ones.
The developmental increase in over-imitation is the most surprising finding, at first sight difficult to explain: why should the cognitive sophistication that grows in adulthood be associated with a growth in blanket copying? Perhaps, an explanation may be seen in the combination of our two major findings summarized above. In the context of a tool-use task, it is possible that an adult will be seen as an 'expert', making their actions worthwhile to imitate at a detailed level, even though the reasons for some of their apparently causally irrelevant actions are not manifest. In contrast, children may be perceived by children and adults alike as less knowledgeable regarding tools, and their tool actions thus 'less reliable', particularly when these actions are seemingly irrelevant. Indeed various recent studies have suggested that preschool children are sensitive to model expertise in domains other than tool use Koenig & Harris, 2005) . Harris and colleagues found that preschool children could identify which of two adult informants (one inaccurate; one accurate) provided the correct label for an object, and subsequently use this information to label novel objects, seek information, predict the informants future actions, and endorse the more accurate speakers claims. In a more recent study, speaker accuracy was found to be more important than age in making reliability judgments, with preschool children trusting the information provided by a previously accurate child model over a previously inaccurate adult model (Jaswal & Neely, 2006) . The particular domain of perceived expertise has also been found to be of crucial importance, with children judging that an adult informant would be better able to answer questions about the nutritional value of food, whereas a child informant would be more able to answer questions about toys (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009) .
A more specific version of the above hypothesis is that the participants saw the irrelevant actions performed by an adult model as more 'intentional' than those performed by a child: perhaps, a seemingly irrelevant action performed by an adult should be worthwhile to copy as it is likely that they intended to perform it, whereas a child may more likely have produced the action accidentally. However, this interpretation seems implausible given that the child model performed the irrelevant sequence a total of five times during the demonstration, making accidental production of the actions unlikely.
The perceived intentionality of the adult model may also be greater than that of the child model insofar as an adult demonstration may contain a greater quality and frequency of ostensive cues (e.g., eye-contact). These cues may suggest to the observer that the adult intends them to perform the task element on which cueing was focused. However, this 'pedagogical' explanation (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Gergely, Egyed, & Kiraly, 2007) seems unlikely to account for the difference between the model conditions, as all the demonstrations in the current study were televised, rendering the occurrence of ostensive cueing unlikely (see below for further discussion of the role of ostensive cues). The intentionally account of over-imitation is also challenged by Nielsen's (2006, Exp. 2) finding that children as young as 18 months frequently attempted to use a difficult, and often unsuccessful, modelled technique to open a box (using a tool) when a more efficient means was readily available (using a hand). Thus, it appears that these young children, who have been shown to be highly sensitive to perceived intent (Meltzoff, 1995) , were ignoring the model's overall intention (to open the box) in favour of performing the challenging means action. Nevertheless, the role of intentionality in the phenomenon of over-copying is an important question, currently a focus of our ongoing research with this paradigm.
A second possible explanation for the pattern of results witnessed is that the children were imitating the specific actions of the model for social reasons (Call & Carpenter, 2009; Carpenter, 2006; Nielsen, 2008, in press ). Nielsen (in press) suggests that 'young children's focus on copying actions over outcomes is a function of their motivation to be social and to interact with the model' (p. 18). However, a social account would need to explain why over-imitation occurred when the demonstration was presented via a televised display. Video models are inherently less social than live displays, as interaction between the observer and the model cannot take place. Indeed, video displays are often used as a non-social condition with which to compare live displays (e.g., Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008) , with studies consistently finding a video deficit (Anderson & Pempek, 2005; Barr & Hayne, 1999; Hayne, Herbert, & Simcock, 2003; McCall, Park, & Kavanugh, 1977) . A social account of over-imitation is also challenged by the finding that the child model did not elicit over-imitation to the same degree as the adult model. If the observers were copying to 'be like the model' then perhaps we may have expected the children, particularly the 5-year-olds, to be most imitative of the 5-year-old child model. However, this pattern of responding was not witnessed in the current study, as the responses of the 5-year-olds and adults were actually more similar than the two groups of children. It could however be argued that the participants were copying in an attempt to please the experimenter (who was in the room with them). Again, this explanation seems unlikely as: (1) the children in Horner and Whiten (2005) were as likely to over-imitate when the experimenter was present during testing, as when she was absent and (2) children continued to over-imitate in Lyons et al. (2007, Exp. 1B) when asked by the 'busy' experimenter to go and check, by themselves, that the target object had been placed in the box for the next participant at the end of the experiment.
A third possible explanation for the occurrence of over-imitation might lie in receptivity to being taught (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Gergely et al., 2007) . Gergely and colleagues argued that human infants actively seek out and show sensitivity and preference for specific types of 'pedagogic' communicative cues. Adults automatically provide these cues (e.g., mutual eye-contact, contingent reactivity) within ostensive cueing contexts, providing children with special opportunities to acquire generalizable knowledge. Contexts of this nature would seem to be particularly advantageous in learning about actions that are cognitively opaque, such as the irrelevant actions in the current study. Combining causally irrelevant actions with ostensive cues such as eye-contact may suggest to the observer that the model is intentionally demonstrating these actions, which may result in these actions being more readily acquired than if they were presented without these cues. At first sight, this account could explain the differences found between the model conditions, as adult demonstrators would likely provide greater quality cueing, and subsequently increased levels of imitation, than child demonstrators. However, an account based on pedagogy seems unlikely to account for the current results for the following reasons. First, the models used in the current study were all televised and thus could not provide ostensive cues contingent on the behaviour of the observer in their demonstrations. Second, rather than being more imitative of the adult model than the child model as a pedagogical approach may predict, the 3-year-olds were more faithful to the child model than the adult model on one of the bolt defence measures. Nevertheless, the overall levels of imitation in the current study are somewhat lower than the equivalent live adult demonstration condition in McGuigan et al. (2007) , particularly in the 3-year-old group. Although McGuigan et al. provided as little ostensive cueing as possible in their live demonstration it is possible that some natural, if unintentional, cueing remained. At 3 years of age, the presence of these ostensive cues during modelling may have encouraged the occurrence of overimitation, whereas by 5 years of age children may have been less reliant on cues of this nature, resulting in little difference between the live and televised displays.
Finally, it could be argued that an explanation for the pattern of performance witnessed may lie in the ability of the participants to follow task directions, or learn from a televised display. It is possible that the children, particularly the 3-year-olds, may have been less inclined to follow the request to attend to, and learn from, the laptop display than were the adults. However, this explanation seems unlikely for several reasons. First, it does not explain why there would be different levels of fidelity to the child and adult models across each age group. If attending to the task instructions, or viewing the demonstrations as a televised display, were impeding performance, then we would have expected performance to be impaired equally across conditions. Second, many of the 3-year-old children performed partial imitations where both bolt removal and reward retrieval occurred, suggesting that they had attended to the whole demonstration. Third, if the experimenter noticed the participant's attention drifting away from the display (which was relatively rare) the child's attention was refocused by a verbal prompt. Lastly, previous studies have shown that children can be directed to, and learn from televised displays by 3 years of age (e.g., McCall et al., 1977) , or younger (e.g., Hayne et al., 2003) . In order to investigate the attentional hypothesis more fully, future studies could allow participants to attempt a task following a demonstration that they are not invited to attend to.
Overall, the present results reiterate and indeed extend, our own and previous findings which suggest that humans become more imitative to the extent of making themselves less efficient in dealing with certain tasks, with age (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007) . The finding that adult humans over-imitate to a greater extent than children would seem at first counter to Lyons et al.'s (2007) proposal that children over-imitate because they interpret all adults' actions as engaged with causally relevant components of tasks. Instead, it seems as though we continue to rely on an 'automatic coding' process as we age, possibly more so when performing novel tasks that are cognitively opaque. This 'automatic coding' may be particularly strong in the presence of 'expert' models, and diluted in the presence of 'non-experts'. This more selective view of automatic coding sits well beside our proposal that the levels of copying witnessed are likely due to an overextension of a highly adaptive 'conformist bias' in combination with a 'model-based bias' which allows selective imitation of appropriate models (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . That adults express a disposition to automatically imitate the actions of others also fits well with studies from social psychology which have shown that adults frequently and involuntarily match or mirror a wide range of behaviours in others including speech related behaviours (e.g., Cappella & Planalp, 1981) , non-verbal behaviours (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) , moods (Neumann & Strack, 2000) , and even emotions (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) . Recent studies have extended this work to show that imitations of this nature may have a highly adaptive value, either in terms of learning and acculturation, or through strengthening the social bonds necessary for reciprocal prosocial behaviour such as child care (e.g., van Barren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004; van Barren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003) .
Discussion of the adaptive nature of imitation within the social psychology literature is consistent with our own theoretical approach. However, the documenting of over-imitation sits awkwardly alongside other findings in developmental psychology suggesting that very young children (e.g., Brugger et al., 2007; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Schwier, van Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006) , preschool children (Bekkering, Wohlshläger, & Grattis, 2000; Gleissner, Meltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000) , and adults (Wohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003) will in certain circumstances be selective in the contexts in which they will imitate. The current study suggests that model age, observer age, and model expertise may be factors that influence such selectivity. Other factors such as task complexity, presence or absence of a goal, and tool or nontool, etc. could all potentially have an influence. Why participants act selectively in one context and over-imitate in others is a difference that now begs to be addressed in further research .
The extent to which we found even adult humans to approach our task in a somewhat 'irrational' manner is initially surprising, as we might expect adults to have a clear appreciation of easily perceived, causally irrelevant actions. We suggest the fact that humans continue to imitate in this extreme fashion way into adulthood highlights the highly adaptive, 'conformist', nature of imitation for our species (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Whiten, 2009 ). However, we have shown that humans also become more likely, with age, to utilize a 'model-based bias', preferentially imitating models who are likely to be more expert in the task. We suggest that this combination of increasing conformity, and increasing selectivity of model type is potentially an extremely powerful strategy to optimize social learning and cultural transmission that is likely to be adaptive in the long-run.
